| The Omnipotence Paradox is an age old problem. However, I assert that it's not only NOT A PROBLEM, but is actually makes an important point about the relationship between the a-priori and the a-posteriori; the relationship between the laws of logic and physical laws. The paradox has involved subjects from degrees in a triangle's corners to heavy rocks to microwave burritos. Let's consider it in its simplest form.
Yes or no, can an all-powerful being (let's say, 'god' for instance) create a rock so heavy he cannot lift it? (Another humorous version of this same paradox is the "Bart Simpson omnipotence paradox", which is, "Can 'god' nuke ("microwave") a burrito so hot that he can't eat it?") If 'god' can create a rock so heavy he can't lift it, then there is something it can't do (lift the created rock). If 'god' cannot create such a rock, then again, there is something it can't do. Therefore there can be no "almighty" being (like 'god' say) that can do anything physically imaginable (have no physical constraints) because the above shows that there will always be something it can't physically do due to logical constraints. In other words, physical a-posteriori reality is itself constrained by a-priori logic, (A point that T. Aquinas missed unfortunately). Thomas Aquinas suggested that the "problem" stemmed from a misunderstanding of the term "omnipotence". He suggested that "god can do anything" is to be limited to notions of physical or practical possibility/impossibility. He argued, not that 'god' can do anything, but that 'god' can do anything POSSIBLE, where "possible" was defined as logically possible, i.e. not violating the laws of logic. In other words, Aquinas relegated the possible actions of 'god' to be subsumed by a-priori laws of logic rather than the other way around. Aquinas wrote in the Summa Theologica: "Whatever does not imply a contradiction is, consequently among those possibilities in virtue of which God is described as omnipotent. But what does imply a contradiction is not subsumed under the divine omnipotence..." What is apparent is that Aquinas didn't mentally grasp that to suggest that there is a being with no physical constraints, but rather only logical constraints is also in itself to pose a logical contradiction as physical reality is constrained by the laws of logic. This is what the omnipotence paradox exposes and what Aquinas unfortunately missed as he "glossed" over the subject (in my personal opinion). I think he was trying to divorce a-posteriori objective reality from a-priori logic, which can't be entirely done. For instance, T. Aquinas didn't seem to appreciate the difference in being challenged to create a four-cornered triangle and that of a being with no physical constraints being challenged to create a rock so heavy that it can't lift it. The former is an a-priori impossibility (which is what his comments in the Summa Theologica actually addressed). However in the latter omnipotence paradox, the only problem is the idea of a being with no a-posteriori limitations. Aquinas missed that NO ONE IS ASKING THE OMNIPOTENT BEING IN THE PARADOX TO VIOLATE THE LAWS OF LOGIC, but like the 'god' he insisted exists, had physical a-posteriori limitations due to logical a-priori constraints. After all, there is NOTHING contradictory about being asked if one can create a rock so heavy that one can't lift it. I can. Just give me some concrete mix, shovel and some water and in a short time I'll definitely have a rock so heavy I can't lift it. (So, in theory, there is apparently something that I can do that 'god' can't). Aquinas also is guilty of omitting an important point, that his 'god' limited by what is logically possible does not resemble the 'god' of the bible. Here are a few quick examples: 1. For 'god' to have created "fowl that may fly above the earth in the open firmament of heaven" from water in Genesis 1:20 and "every fowl of the air" from dirt in Genesis 2:19 is logically impossible. 2. Since "by twos" doesn't equal "by sevens", its logically impossible for 'god' to order animals into the ark "by twos"; the unclean animals "by twos" and the clean animals "by sevens"; and then they all went on the ark "by twos as 'god' commanded", as stated in Genesis 6,7, & 8. 3. With any consistent definition of "days", when Jesus in Luke 23:43 told the crucified "good thief" "Verily I say unto thee, To day shalt thou be with me in paradise", it's logically impossible for 'god' to have welcomed this thief into heaven that very same day with Jesus, if Jesus in fact went to hell to pay for everyone's sins/defeat death/fight the devil, and/or went to "prison" and "preached to the spirits of the dead" as it says in 1 Peter, AND THEN resurrect and hang out with the disciples before ascending to heaven as a physical body three to four days or so after he died. 4. It's logically impossible for it to be impossible for people to keep the law and be blameless in the eyes of the lord (which is what in theory makes Jesus' death necessary if people are to go to heaven) when John the Baptists parents were said to do just this in Luke 1:5-6. (It can't be impossible for people to do if people did it). A cursory and obligatory address of the lesser intelligent objections to the paradox: 1. Other objections include the claim that the question is meaningless since asking if an all-powerful being can create a rock so heavy it can't lift shows a contradiction, ergo there cannot be both an all-powerful being AND a rock it can't lift. 2. Another way of (supposedly) dealing with the problem is for 'god' to suddenly relinquish his "almighty" powers upon having created the rock. (In other words, the "special plead" is for the terms of the problem to be inconsistent). This version also defeats its own purpose, since the logical condition would affect ANY omnipotent being from its first moment of existence, then if it were to relinquish its omnipotence, then the same conclusion is reached, that there can be no omnipotent beings. If one were to (daftly) argue that after not lifting the rock, one can gain one's omnipotent powers again, then even if one could (I don't see how) then as soon as the powers reappeared, so would the logial conundrum that led to the relinquishing of the powers to begin with, for the problem is not "rocks" or "burritos", but its a condition inherent in being supposedly omnipotent. 3. Another objection is the claim that "all-powerful" is not synonymous with unlimited abilities. The three types of objections above are all unintelligent claptrap in my opinion. To argue about the semantics of the terms used in a problem that is actually about formal logic ("form" stresses syntax) is to miss the point. One could just as easily ask "can 'x' do 'y' to the point that it can't 'z' it?" Quibbling over (and spinning) the "proper" definition of "omnipotent" is pointless if the word is not used in the paradox itself, and it doesn't have to be. The paradox can be phrased in any way one wants. I can just as easily state "Yes or no, do seventeen-legged zebras have the ability to create a rock so heavy that they can't lift it?", so "power" vs "ability" is a lame and inadequate objection since I could just as easily ask "does 'x' have the ability..." The inability of the coexistence of a being capable of doing anything imaginable and a rock it can't lift IS THE PURPOSE of posing the question. Of course it's absurd in its entirety; it's a Reductio ad absurdum, (RAA). Since it's absurd, the contradictory must be true, and since there is nothing inherently absurd about creating rocks that one can't lift then the idea of a being with unlimited physical (a posteriori) abilities has to go because its existence would pose an existential absurdity. Conclusion/Summary: 1. I contend that there really are no legitimate "problems" with the Omnipotence Paradox, as it adequately points out that a being with no physical a-posteriori limitations is itself an a-priori logically absurd concept. That is, "omnipotent", in any version clashes with reality. 2. Thomas Aquinas, (admirable in his own right), unfortunately missed the point that anyone posing the paradox is not requesting the subject of the paradox perform any logically contradictory acts, hence his comments about the paradox in the Summa Theologica missed the mark. However his claim would be relevant if someone were to ask "can 'god' create four-cornered triangles". 3. He's guilty of omitting the point that 'his' 'god' that can only possibly do the logically possible has nothing to do with the Christian 'god' of the bible which is often described in logically impossible terms. LOGOS |
| The Omnipotence paradox
(How I think Thomas Aquinas got it all wrong) |
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