| No Evidence of 'god' |
| Part 1. Evidence is a Conditional Probability contingent upon existence. Proponents of 'god' or ID enthusiasts often say that the existence of a "complex" or "ordered" universe or life in the universe is "evidence" of a 'god' or designer. Actually, this is illusory. Theists are engaging in "premature speculation". There can be no indirect evidence for something where there isn't any direct evidence first. By direct evidence, I mean that we must empirically verify the existence of 'god' or a precedent of 'god' to establish that the existence of a 'god' is even possible. Why is it that there can be no known indirect evidence of a 'god' which has no direct evidence and no precedent? Because it's a conditional probability. Only the existent can create evidence of its own existence. If we cannot show direct evidence of 'god' (literally show or demonstrate a 'god'), then we cannot say that the existence of any 'god' is a probability greater than zero. If we have not yet established that the existence of a 'god' is possible, then we don't know that the universe, a tree or a single cell can possibly be indirect evidence of any 'gods'. Expressed slightly differently, if we can't consider the existence of 'god' to be pr(g) > 0 (probability of 'god' is greater than zero), then we cannot consider trees and single cells to be pr(i) > 0 (probability of indirect evidence is greater than zero). Again, this is because of logical entailment. Only the existent can create evidence of its own existence and since 'created evidence' is totally dependent on the existence of that which is supposed to create it, then the probability of actual evidence cannot exceed the probability of the existence of the thing which is supposed to create the evidence to begin with. Well, what about circumstantial evidence used everyday in court of law? Isn't that indirect evidence and isn't this the same thing? Well, yes and no. Yes, it is the same thing, but no, it is a different circumstance because we can bring prior knowledge of direct evidence to the consideration in 'normal' cases. In a crime investigation, if a tire track is examined, we bring the prior knowledge that tires demonstrably exist and leave tracks. We can show it. There is precedent for the idea that tires leave tracks, but there is no established and demonstrable prior direct evidential knowledge of supernatural beings, transcendent realms, ghosts, goblins or 'gods'. It is not simply sophestry to say that indirect evidence like an "ordered" universe, life etc cannot lend any credence to claims of the existence of gods. I can prove it using inductive symbolic logic. But first, here's my verbal version of the argument that there can be no indirect evidence of existence. An 'ordered' universe, life in the universe, a tree or a flower cannot be considered indirect evidence of the existence of a 'god' or a universe designer since 'god'/designer would first need to exist before it could create the evidence to begin with. It's a conditional probability. If 'god'/designer DOES NOT exist, then a tree or flower would not be evidence of this 'god'/designer's existence. If a 'god'/designer DOES exist, then it could potentially create such indirect evidence, but then the evidence of existence would be a moot point since there can only be evidence if there is a 'god'/designer to create it. Because this 'god'/designer must exist before it can create evidence of itself, we must first know via direct evidence of an existing 'god'/designer before we can legitimately call a tree or flower, 'ordered' universe or life in the universe indirect evidence of the existence of 'god'/designer, at which point such indirect evidence would be worthless and not actually having to do with existence, since that would be already established via the direct evidence. In any event, the probability of the existence of indirect evidence of the existence of a 'god'/designer cannot exceed the probability of the existence of the 'god'/designer that is required to create the indirect evidence to begin with, which makes calling an 'ordered' universe 'indirect evidence' pointless and meaningless. Here's the same argument supported with inductive symbolic logic. The structure of the argument that suggests that an "ordered" universe, for instance, is "evidence" of the existence of a 'god' or a universe designer/creator goes as follows. 1. pr(x|g) > pr(x|~g) (The probability of 'x' given that there is a 'god' is more likely or higher than the probability of 'x' given that there is no 'god'. Where 'x' represents something demonstrable, like life in our universe or an "ordered universe".) But of course, we don't care what the probability of 'x' is, since the 'ordered' universe and life in the universe, etc is a probability of 1, (100%). We only care what the probability of the existence of 'god' is. What theists SHOULD be arguing is... 2. pr(g|x) > pr(~g|x) (The probability of 'god' given 'x' is higher than the probability of no existing 'god' given 'x'.) Equation 2 is the inverse (also called the converse) of equation 1, yet their argument is about the probability of 'x', not 'god's' alleged existence. Relying on equation 1 is flawed. Can we just presume that if equation 1 is true then we can assume the converse is true also? No we can't. If I see a Tasmanian Devil in the wild, I'm probably in Tasmania. However if I'm in Tasmania, I'm probably not going to see a Tasmanian Devil in the wild. How does one then get from equation 1 to equation 2? Via an inversion formula, which is... INV: pr(a|b) = pr(b|a) + pr(a)/pr(b) When applied to equation 1, we get... 3. pr(g|x) + pr(x)/pr(g) > pr(~g|x) + pr(x)/pr(~g) Since pr(x) is a tautological given (100% probability), we can change it to '1' on both sides of the equation and thus it cancels out of both sides of the equation to give us... 4. pr(g|x)/pr(g) > pr(~g|x)/pr(~g) Since this is an equation, we can swap the numerator on one side with the denominator on the other side, for example... (a/b > c/d) = (a/c > b/d). We can swap equation 4 around to say... 5. pr(g|x)/pr(~g|x) > pr(g)/pr(~g) Now, let's go back and look at where we're trying to get to, equation 2. 2. pr(g|x) > pr(~g|x) This can also be expressed as... 2a. pr(g|x)/pr(~g|x) > 1 Notice how the first part of equation 2a is identical to the first part of equation 5, and our objective is to get from equation 5 (which is derived from equation 1) to equation 2. So, what we need is for the latter part of equation 5 to satisfy the latter part of equation 2a to gain us a successful inversion of equation 1 into equation 2. In other words we need... pr(g)/pr(~g) > or = 1 That is, in order to satisfy the inversion from equation 1 to equation 2, we must show that the existence of 'god' is equal to or more likely than no existing 'god' SANS INDIRECT EVIDENCE, LIKE AN ORDERED UNIVERSE OR LIFE IN THE UNIVERSE. (Remember, this tautological given cancels out of the equation). In simpler terms, an "ordered universe" etc CANNOT support the notion of an existing 'god'. To show that an existing 'god' is even possible (pr > 0), one is forced to demonstrate the existence of at least one 'god' or at least show a precedent for 'god'. Only the existent creates evidence of its own existence. The bane of thinking that the necessarily true is "evidence" of something not demonstrable or even known possible is the fact that tautologies are meaningless. That is, the fact that any given tautology is true is no reflection on anything else. This is why the theist (mis)understanding of the Anthropic Principle is invalid and meaningless. Part 2. 'X' being false will not make 'god' come true. Deductive logic is not the same as Inductive logic. Deductive logic is where one 'deducts' and what ever is left over is your "answer". If an opaque box contains only three oranges and an apple, and I reach in and grab a fruit, pull it out and it turns out that I grabbed the apple, then I can "deduce" that the box contains only oranges (and air). Deductive logic is certain, that is, deductive valid inferences are not probabilistic, they are logically true or false. Inductive logic IS a matter of probabilities. All the time. Considerations of 'gods', universe origins, the origin of life in the universe, etc are inductive in nature. That is, we don't have any factual answers other than the tautological ones such as there is an "ordered" universe and there is life in it, etc. The deductive example I used above is an example of an indirect proof. If it is true that the box contained only three oranges and one apple and if it is true that I pulled out the apple and no other fruit has been removed, then it must be true that the box still contains three oranges. Indirect proofs don't work for inductive subjects. For instance if the box contained three oranges, an apple and possibly many unknown and unaccounted for things, and I pulled out the apple, then the next item I pull out isn't necessarily going to be an orange. Where theists run into trouble quite often is in presuming that "the 'god' question" is a matter for deduction, not induction, and thus attempt to engage in deductive reasoning and indirect proofs where it is invalid to do so. For instance, their focus on evolution theory of the species. It is often presumed that if they show chinks in the armor of evolution theory then it will "beg the premise" of a creator. They are thinking that the "good idea" of 'god' can only be succeeded by a better idea, so in their mind it makes sense to denounce evolution theory of the species so the "'god' idea" seems stronger in comparison. But, being an inductive matter, this simply isn't true. The truth is, if evolution theory is false, then it won't make creationism (or 'god') come true. We don't know it has to be one or the other, so "proving" one false won't make the other the default truth. "Well, then how do you explain..." they may ask. My answer? I don't. The matter isn't deductive. In fact, it is invalid for the theist to suggest that "god" is a more likely answer compared to 'x' if the theist cannot show that the existence of 'god' is even possible, i.e. if he can't show pr(g) > 0. In homage to Douglas Adams, lets presume that the answer to the ultimate question to life, the universe and everything is '42'. If '42' is false, it won't make 'god' come true. And in order to avoid granting unearned merit to ideas, we have to consider what merit "'god' exists" has to offer SANS indirect evidence. (A point explained in part 1.) Can you show me 'god', or ANY 'god' or show me that ANY supernatural thing even CAN exist? I dare say no. (If you think you can, then win my $10,000.00 cash prize offered on this site's homepage). If evolution theory of the species (or any other scientific theory) is false, it won't make 'god' come true, and the skeptic doesn't need evolution theory of the species to be true before its true that creationism has no legs to stand on. Evolution theory, and all other scientific theories are theologically irrelevant and for theists to focus on said subject is either a case of mistaken and illogical reasoning or a red herring, intentional or not. For the theist to attack scientific theories is simply an illogical waste of time. Part 3. Granting unearned merit is unreasonable. What if we DID grant unearned merit to the idea of 'god' or other things. Would that be so bad? I mean, after all, if we DON'T know that 'god' is impossible, then what is the harm in believing that it may be true? I mean if something isn't known to be either true or false, then why presume it is false instead of saying instead that 'true or false may be possible'? Because granting unearned merit to ideas proves to be an invalid concept. Consider: Let's call the idea of granting unearned merit to the idea of existing 'gods' "Idea #1". Idea #1 would grant unearned merit to the idea of an existing 'god' named Yahweh (the 'god' of the Judeo/Christian bible). It would also grant unearned merit to the idea of an existing 'god' named Stan (Where Stan is a 'god' that is mutually exclusive to the existence of Yahweh). If Stan exists, Yahweh doesn't, and if Yahweh exists, Stan doesn't. So Stan existing ("S") is equivalent to Yahweh ("Y") not existing. (Let's use the 'tilde' sign "~" to mean "not"). So 'S' = ~'Y' and 'Y' =~'S'. Stan existing would mean ~'Y'. Idea # 1 supports 'Y' and 'S' equally. Which means that Idea #1 equally supports 'Y' and ~'Y'. What valid idea grants equal unearned merit to both 'Y' and ~'Y' in the same instance? No valid idea at all. Part 4. Vague is Robust Vague is robust and inversely proportional to meaning. What the devil am I talking about? "Robust" in this context means strong, difficult, maybe even impossible to refute. So, isn't this a good thing? Isn't certitude valuable? Well, yes and no. If considered in a larger framework where certitude IS desired, then certitude is "good" in that particular context, but certitude in and of itself is the inverse of meaning. (A counterintuitive point). Vague is robust. A weather forecast for El Paso, TX in June that says "Warm" is not very meaningful, but it is rather robust. It is very likely to be warm in El Paso, TX in June, but the meaning or "value added" by the "warm" comment is very little. The more known-likely something is, the less it being what it is understood to be is of value in and of itself (meaningfulness). The extreme of this idea is a tautology. "It is either raining or it isn't", is a VERY robust statement. However we wish to define raining, then at any given time and place it is either raining or it is not raining. A tautology is something that MUST be true and cannot under any circumstances be false. So, what is the innate "value" of a tautology being true? NOTHING. "It is either raining or it isn't" is not meaningful at all. Such a statement has no innate value. "God" is EXTREMELY vague. The word 'god' may have an incomplete, vague and sometimes contradictory semantic meaning(s), but there is no legitimate ontological meaning behind the concept of 'god' until one shows up for us to examine. There is no reasonable doubt about it. Whether we are referring to the alleged being in the Abrahamic traditions that is supposed to be further advanced from us that we are from the ameba or whether we are referring simply to supernatural spirits like the Chinese kitchen 'god' or the 'god' that lives under Chinese family's front door threshold; 'god', in any event is undefined and vague. Many logicians and philosophers have tried to devise "ontological proofs" for the existence of 'god', usually hinged on the so called "necessity" of its existence, or the existence of an "ultimate" thing. These descriptions all suffer from the theory-laden subjective ideas of what "ultimate" is supposed to mean, the fact that an allegedly existing thing with infinite properties leads to existential paradoxes, the fact that ontology of 'X' when 'X' is not demonstrable is not in itself verifiable or refutable (and thus meaningless) and last but not least, the problem that they cannot prove that 'god's' alleged existence is even known to be possible. In short, "god" is meaningless. Just as saying "the forecast for El Paso, TX in June is 'warm'" is not very meaningful is not a commentary about how one feels about warm weather, but rather that the comment itself has little innate meaning, so to "'god' is meaningless" is not a commentary about one's religious experiences or one's take on religion as a social factor, but rather about the non-specificity, ambiguity and cryptic nature of religion and theology. Part 5. Nonsense in the Magic Kingdom Phrases such as, "'god' spoke light into existence" is ostensibly a phrase about a process, yet this process is innately meaningless and incomprehensible. The term 'god' is ephemeral, and speaking light into existence is also, I venture to say, incomprehensible nonsense. "'god' breathed life into the nostrils of the man made from dirt" is as innately meaningless as, "Jabberwocky chortled the color television into outer space", or Noam Chomsky's famous nonsensical phrase, "Colorless green ideas sleep furiously". Further delving and mining deeper and deeper into the nature of theist thinking (in the tradition of the Socratic Method) will eventually strike the vein rich in a common fundamental element, "It was magic", and the agent was SIM, the (one or more) Special Invisible Magician(s), who is/are exempt from the rules of reality, such as the confines of logic, physics, epistemology, ontology, etc. Where is this 'god' being (SIM) now? Oh, he's on a transcendent plane (the magic kingdom) in another dimension or reality (deep in the heart of the enchanted forest). (Busy defeating red dragon/talking serpents no doubt. After all, what good is a powerful wizard without a magic red dragon to battle. ;-) ). More often than not, theists don't understand the difference between a comprehensible and reasonable answer to a straight forward and meaningful question and that of a nonsensical gobbledygook "answer" to a meaningless question. "Existence must come from existence because something cannot come from nothing", I've been told. Yet when pressed as to exactly how "existence comes from existence" no answer was forthcoming. "Who created the universe" is another one, (with the theist more often than not seeing anything biased about the "who" in the question). Where did 'god' come from is usually followed by the "answer" of, "He is self-existent" or some other equally nonsensical and meaningless phrase. Theist vague, cryptic nonsensical phrases belie their purpose. They relay the message that "The Message" is ultimately not meant to be comprehensible at all, but merely vacuous platitudes masquerading as answers. "It was magic" indeed. Part 6. Absurdities & paradoxes in the Magic Kingdom The idea of objectively existing things having infinite properties leads to absurdities. Some ideas of 'gods' suggest that they do have infinite properties (and of course, other ides of 'gods' make no such claims. It is a major occupation of the Chinese to "trick" their 'gods' in some way or another to avoid pissing them off. They are not 'all-knowing' and/or 'all-powerful'). As to the idea that 'god' is "all-powerful" or "all mighty" i.e. omnipotent, consider... 1. "Yes or no, does 'god' have the power to do 'Y' to such an extent that 'god' cannot 'Z' it?" In other words, can 'god' create a rock so heavy he cannot lift it? Or can he microwave a burrito so hot that he can't eat it? (The latter is the Bart Simpson version of the omnipotence paradox). The point, of course, is that whether the answer is yes or no, there is something 'god' does not have the power to do, which means that there can be no all-powerful 'gods'. -One of the criticisms of the omnipotence paradox typically states that it takes the form of a meaningless question, much like the "what will happen when an irresistible force meets an immovable object" question, but this is not true. There is nothing inherently absurd about big heavy rocks, picking up or not picking up rocks, microwaving hot burritos etc. The only thing absurd is the idea of an omnipotent objectively existing being or object (which is THE POINT). The omnipotence paradox is an RAA (Reductio Ad Absurdum) proof that there cannot be omnipotent beings or objects. -Another criticism of the omnipotence paradox is that it only disproves the existence of an absurd 'god' or being that breaks the laws of nature and logic. Descartes and other theists (typically Christians) have tried to twist the term "omnipotence" into representing something not absurd, but of course the point is that 'god' in the Abrahamic religions IS absurd. It IS described as a being that violates the "natural" laws of physics and logic. Unless one wishes to propound that 'god' is a mortal and a clever technologically advanced space alien, or a limited being like the 'gods' in the Chinese 'god' pantheon, then the omnipotence paradox certainly has its value. It certainly addresses the "above the laws of nature" 'god' of the Abrahamic traditions. Also, consider... 2. "Yes or no, does 'god' have the power to pose a question that he cannot answer?" Again, whether the answer is yes or no, there is something 'god' cannot do. There can be no omnipotent AND omniscient beings. For that matter... 3. "Can 'god' prove he doesn't exist?" ;-) Part 7. ...And back to Meaninglessness... Many people claim to have knowledge of their 'god' "doing things" i.e. that it makes physical observable and lasting changes to our physical universe, either in answer to prayer or on its own volition. Yet when asked if what the believers "know" can be shown and verified to non-believers, they invariably balk at such a suggestion. Not because it is impractical, but because the believers suggest that it is categorically absurd. The thing is, I can observe the physical universe as well as the next guy, but they can't allow their "perfect" being to have an opportunity to fail. If 'god' does not do anything, then it is meaningless. If 'god' DOES do anything, then show me. A 'god' that pretends to not exist is relegated to being a meaningless concept. Part 8. ...and even more meaninglessness. Meaningless Standards. A. The moral standard of value expressed in the bible is "god's' will". Whatever "'god's' will" is, is default "good" and "moral" and to aid 'god' and his will is to be "holy". Ergo, 'god' cannot be immoral. So how meaningful is it supposed to be to state that "'god' is good", or "god" is holy"? Such platitudes can have no meaning at all, because there is supposedly no possible alternative. Its like saying that "water is wet", or "one foot in length equals exactly one foot in length", (Or rather that, "one foot in length does not, NOT, equal one foot in length", which is the same thing). Yet we get such meaningless platitudes all the time that are supposed to be meaningful comments. B. The "almighty" 'god' of the bible possesses the ability and power to do anything and cannot be immoral by the standard of values used to assess "moral" in the bible. This is a contradiction. If doing the will of 'god' is to be moral, then "almighty" 'god' cannot exist because there would be something that this omnipotent being cannot do (be immoral). C. Something's got to go, either the idea that following 'god's' will is the standard of morality OR the existence of this alleged 'god' as described. If the 'god' "goes", then the issue becomes a moot point. If the standard "goes", then there are all sorts of things described in the OT and NT that are arguably evil, such as killing Egyptian first born babies just to terrify people ('god' is described as a terrorist in Exodus) and necessitating the torture and death of his innocent son so that he can manage to "forgive" others for being born a decedent of Adam if nothing else. The Vampire LOGOS |
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| (With all kudos to Professor Graham Priest for the line of thinking with the symbolic inductive logic segment.) |